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When the European Economic Community was established I was 11 years 
old. When the disintegration of Yugoslavia started I was 46 years old. I 
have been living in Europe all my life but nevertheless, I learned a lot 
reading this book; new elements and views on the prevailing impressions 
and beliefs about the history of the EU and its enlargement. 
The starting point of the book is that all of the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) are not newcomers to Europe, but are in fact returning 
to Europe. Secondly, a different path from the one they took could have 
led to different results, less sacrifice and pain related to shock therapy 
and neoliberal reforms (p. 6). What makes this book really interesting and 
different is the fact that the “story” of enlargement is examined from an 
Asian perspective. A new and interesting insight is the author’s claim that 
the process of transition could have been different and less painful, if 
the countries in the region had learned from the experiences of Asian 
industrializing countries.
The first chapter dwells on the changes in CEECs and provides new 
insight into the history of the region and its relations with the EU. It offers 
a criticism of neoliberal recipes and the shock therapy prescribed by the 
IMF and G. Sachs. The latter was a “parachuting” adviser to the regions’ 
governments regarding transition and privatisation backed by the US 
and IMF’s Washington consensus approach in its original form. The author 
elaborates on the region’s efforts to catch up with the West and the 
problems arising from putting the process on a fast track. It is followed 
by a chapter on Poland, which is for many reasons a specific and a very 
interesting story due to its internal economic reasons and its (historical) 
geographical position (vicinity to Germany and Russia). 
The chapter which overviews South Eastern Europe is rich and based 
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on extensive reading of the empirical evidence of the happenings in 
the region. However, we all have different perspectives, so do not be 
surprised if an interpretation departs from what you think or believe. These 
differences add to the creativity of the author and the richness of the 
book. For instance, being Slovene, I have a somewhat different opinion 
on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The author may have placed too 
much emphasis on external and economic reasons contributing to the 
disintegration. He claims, for instance, that the “premature recognition 
of Slovenia and Croatia by EC member states destabilized Bosnia and 
Herzegovina“(p. 8). He later even claims that this “caused the breakup of 
the Yugoslav Federation and triggered tragic ethnic conflicts” (p. 48). He 
goes on to say that “shock therapy spurred escalation of conflicts among 
the republics leading to the subsequent breakup of the Federation and 
fierce ethnic conflicts” (p. 6). From an insider’s perspective, this seems 
as only a rather modest element of the mosaic. The major causes of 
disintegration are much more complex, deeply rooted in the history of 
the last 500 years, and even more so in the events of the Second World 
War. Both Slovenia and Croatia tried to keep Yugoslavia together by, for 
instance, proposing a confederate system and several other reforms, but 
they were rejected, mostly by the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević, 
which tried to keep Yugoslavia together by abolishing the high level of 
autonomy of its republics. It achieved part of this aspiration by abolishing 
the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. This was a greater cause of 
problems in Kosovo than “shock therapy” was(p. 48), which is seen by 
Koyama as the element “spurring escalation of conflicts among the 
republics” (p.48). 
In spite of the growing inequality between the more and the less 
developed republics during socialist Yugoslavia, economic reasons were 
not the major drivers of disintegration. They certainly played a role, but 
not a major one. The major reasons for disintegration were historical, 
ethnic, religious and the different opinions on the future of the Yugoslav 
federation (centralised as Milošević saw it, or more confederative as the 
Slovenes and Croatians saw it). There were also differences of opinion 
regarding European integration. For instance, the Slovenes were pushing 
for it, but Milošević was against it. The author is closer to the mark when 
claiming that the “Kosovo problem triggered the breakup of the former 
Yugoslavia” (p. 8, 201). In this chapter, Koyama rightly mentions the 
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experiences of Poland as a success story, partly because of a “shorter 
period of socialism” (p. 82) but, also, we can add, good policies during 
the transition period in contrast to bad policies in some other CEECs.
Chapter II, concentrating on the Western Balkans, starts with the 
complicated story of Kosovo. An in-depth historical overview is provided 
as the background for the problems of the present. This background is 
illuminating even for those who have lived in SFRY for many years. The 
chapter demonstrates a deep knowledge of the issue, although more 
from the Serbian than from the Albanian perspective. It was not only the 
“violence and harassment by Albanians” in the 1980s which stimulated 
Serbian nationalism, as the author claims, but also the deeply rooted 
historical disputes present among both groups for a long time. The author 
does not put enough emphasis on the abolishment of the autonomy of 
Kosovo or the harassment and violence against Albanians in the late 1980 
and the beginning of 1990s performed by Serbs, which were the triggers 
of problems in this region. Certainly, as the author states, the “harassment 
by Albanians in the first half of the 1980s stimulated Serbian nationalism” 
(p.111). However, the reasons are much deeper. One has to look into 
the long-term policies of Milošević aimed at Serbian hegemony in the 
federation, the abolition of autonomy of the province of Kosovo and 
the Serbian harassment of Albanians in the distant and recent history. 
Furthermore, the claim that “the international community has accelerated 
the process” of ethnic conflict (p. 97) is not well founded, nor is the position 
that the bombardment by NATO “strengthened the position of Milošević 
in Serbia” (p. 105). It might have been true in the short-term, but later 
developments proved it stimulated his fall since internal opposition was 
strengthened.
The author is right in explaining the path of the latest EU member state, 
Croatia, alluding to the “danger of becoming the second Greece”, 
referring to Greece’s heavy dependence on tourism. He emphasizes the 
need to “develop manufacturing industries” (p. 171) in order to diversify its 
economic structure and reduce its dependence on tourism. 
Serbia (ch. 6), which is only starting its path to EU membership, is a different 
story. The situation has changed, the initial enthusiasm has vanished as 
a result of the crisis of the EU and the Eurozone, and the demands on 
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potential new members have increased. Koyama demonstrates in-depth 
knowledge about the Serbian economy and political situation and its, as 
he puts it, “adverse international environment”. It could be mentioned 
that such an environment is not generic but is in fact a reaction to Serbian 
policies and roles in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and its ethnic wars. 
Such internal factors contributed to its lagging behind in development 
and transition.
The chapters on individual countries explain well and in-depth their 
economic and political development based on rich data and documents. 
This also holds true for Macedonia with its everlasting name problem, and 
the veto of Greece, which is the main obstacle to EU membership. The 
author also justifiably emphasises the importance of regional cooperation, 
manifested also in CEFTA. Upon EU accession, trade within CEFTA becomes 
much more expensive, and the EU should address this issue with more 
care. Nevertheless, it is not the only problem. “Macedonia has always 
been facing the problem of structural weakness of its economy”, (p. 222) 
which has recently been addressed with liberal and proactive policies to 
attract FDI. There are also ethnic problems, although these have been 
“settled for the time being by the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, 
but the situation is still precarious” (p. 222).
The interesting parts in the contribution on Albania are the analogy with 
the Meiji restoration in 1868 and the one connecting its development 
to the experiences of Japan in the second part of the 19th century by 
referring to the role of talented persons. Koyama reflects on the pressing 
problem of the Albanian economy, the exodus of the (educated) work 
force, claiming that in the Japanese experience “only limited number 
of people were sent to Western countries and they absorbed the latest 
information and technology in the West and contributed to the economic 
development in Japan. In contrast, the contemporary Albanian society 
has suffered from serious brain drain” (p. 255-256). One can only agree 
with Koyama’s statement that “it takes time, perhaps more than a 
generation, for democracy, rule of law, etc. to be rooted in the Albanian 
society” (p. 256).
The Baltic states (part III of the book), together with Slovenia, are a different 
story. The Baltic countries differ because of their geographical position and 
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historical relations with Russia/the Soviet Union and Slovenia by being by 
far the most developed part of Yugoslavia and the richest among all the 
new member states. Koyama is right in saying that after the initial success 
of Slovenia’s first years of transition, it turned out to be a failure, as it was 
affected more deeply by the economic crisis than other new EU member 
states. But the economic crisis does not explain it completely. There 
are many internal reasons why Slovenia is still facing the crisis, although 
moderate growth resumed in 2014. Slower privatization and gradualism 
are emphasized as traits of the specific Slovenian transition path. The 
author is quite right in claiming that political interference in the economy 
was one of the reasons for mostly failed leveraged management by 
objectives (MBOs), which were regarded by managers to “escape from 
political intervention”. The timing of such MBOs was bad, just before the 
economic crisis, leading to a collapse of many companies. There were 
bad management reasons behind it as well, such as restructuring, which 
came too late and were too slow (structural reforms) and adjustments to 
tectonic changes in the world as well as heavy investments in non-core 
business leading to huge non-performing loans.
The book concludes with the Eurozone crisis focusing on the Baltic states, 
Latvia in particular. The dependence of these countries on foreign capital 
is emphasized, particularly from Sweden and in the banking sector.
Koyama claims that “CEECs had almost no relation with subprime loans in 
the USA, but they were indirectly affected” (p. 344). He is also convinced 
that “relying solely on austerity has led to a vicious circle of deepening 
the recession” and, “dividing Europe.” Koyama’s plea for new wisdom 
replacing the austerity measures is well placed also because of the 
negative effects on cohesion and the catching up of the new and less 
developed members. One can add to this the need to recognize that “it 
takes two to tango”; it is not only the south and less developed countries 
who should adjust to resolve the crisis, but also the most developed 
countries, such as Germany.
In the concluding chapter Koyama again emphasises that the CEECs are 
not newcomers to Europe but are, rather, “returning to Europe”. Strong 
emphasis is given to the role of the USA “as a shadow major actor” (p. 360) 
in the region. This is explained through the non-acceptance of Mitterrand’s 
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frequently forgotten plan of a “pan European confederation” in 1989 and 
opting for the US solution of “accelerated transformation into capitalism” 
delinking the region from the influence of the Soviet Union. One cannot 
escape from the impression that perhaps too much emphasis is given to 
external factors, while internal ones are being neglected. 
The book ends with a very contemporary reference to Ukraine claiming 
that it should “act as a bridge between the EU and Russia which would 
be beneficial both for Ukraine and for the EU and Russia” (p. 365). Either-
or policies, such as making Ukraine decide between the EU and Russia, 
ignore the deeply rooted history of the region.
I can recommend the book to all those interested in the EU and its 
enlargement, to academics, businessmen, the general public in all 
the Western Balkan countries as well as to those from countries which 
joined the EU after the fall of the Berlin wall. The author has not only read 
extensively on the issues, but has also spent a lot of time in the region. His 
interpretations have a touch of ‘hands on’ experience which makes the 
book even more interesting and provocative.
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